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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - MARYLAND RULE 746 - SCHED-
ULING CRIMINAL CASES FOR TRIAL - MARYLAND RULE 746
REQUIRES THAT CRIMINAL CHARGES BE DISMISSED WHEN
STATE FAILS TO BRING CASE TO TRIAL WITHIN PRE-
SCRIBED PERIOD AND FAILS TO ESTABLISH EXTRAORDI-
NARY CAUSE JUSTIFYING POSTPONEMENT. STATE v.
HICKS, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Hicks,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
application of Maryland Rule 746 is mandatory.3 Rule 746 now
requires that a criminal trial date be set within 180 days4 after the
earlier of the appearance or waiver of counsel or the appearance of
the defendant before the court.' The rule further provides that, upon
a showing of "extraordinary cause," an administrative judge or a
judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date., The
appropriate sanction for the state's failure to comply with this
"180-day rule"' is dismissal of the criminal charges.' Prior to Hicks,
Maryland courts had interpreted the precursors of Rule 7469 as
directory, rather than mandatory, because the General Assembly
had not explicitly provided the sanction of dismissal of an indictment
for administrative noncompliance. 10
The Hicks court further held that Rule 746, unlike the sixth
amendment speedy trial right, does not require the state to invoke
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers" in order to bring a
1. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). Chief Judge Murphy delivered the opinion of
the court. Judge Davidson filed a dissenting opinion with which Judges Cole
and Digges concurred. Id. at 321-33, 403 A.2d at 362-68.
2. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
3. 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979).
4. Formerly, Md. Rule 746 provided that a trial date be set not later than 120 days
after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of the
defendant before the court pursuant to Md. Rule 723. Md. Rule 746 was
amended on an emergency basis on November 16, 1979, to change the time
period specified by the rule from 120 to 180 days. 6 Md. Reg. 1915 (1979).
5. Md. Rule 746(a). See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
6. Md. Rule 746(b). See text accompanying note 41 infra.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979).
9. Prior to the adoption of Md. Rule 746, the scheduling of criminal cases for trial
was governed by former Md. Rule 740 and MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a)
(1979).
10. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979). See Young v. State,
15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467
(1972).
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A to 616R (1979). Under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers, either a prisoner incarcerated in a penal facility of
another state or the state in which untried criminal charges are pending
against the prisoner may request his temporary transfer for trial.
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defendant incarcerated in another state to trial.'2 The court found,
upon the particular facts of the case, that "extraordinary cause" had
been shown in compliance with the rule's requirement for a change
of trial date 3 and remanded the case for prosecution."' On
rehearing, 5 the court gave its holding prospective effect only,
limiting its application to cases that commence after July 25,
1979.11 This casenote discusses the Hicks decision with emphasis
upon the scheduling of criminal cases for trial and the public policies
that underlie Rule 746.
II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF HICKS
While serving a sentence in a Delaware prison, Harley Robert
Hicks invoked the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers 7 to obtain trial upon criminal charges then pending
against him in Wicomico County, Maryland." As a result, Hicks was
transferred to Wicomico County, tried, and subsequently sentenced
to a term of imprisonment to run consecutively with his Delaware
sentence.19
Prior to Hicks' return to the Delaware prison, an eight-count
criminal information was filed, charging him with additional
Maryland offenses.20 On April 24, 1978, the public defender entered
12. 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979).
13. Id. at 318-19, 403 A.2d at 360-61. See Md. Rule 746(b).
14. 285 Md. 310, 321, 403 A.2d 356, 362 (1979).
15. The state filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the holdings that Md.
Rule 746 is mandatory and that the appropriate sanction for noncompliance is
dismissal. Id. at 334, 403 A.2d at 368 (per curiam decision on motion for
reconsideration). The state further requested that, if the court declined to
reconsider the holdings, they be given purely prospective effect. Id. Reconsid-
eration is governed by Md. Rule 850.
16. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 338, 403 A.2d 356, 371 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 616D(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall
be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place
of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of
the indictment, information or complaint: provided that for good cause
shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reason-
able continuance.
18. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 313, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979).
19. Id. Hicks was tried on April 4, 1978, and sentenced to three years
imprisonment.
20. Id. The criminal information was filed on April 21, 1978, charging Hicks with
storehouse breaking and related offenses. Id. at 313 n.2, 403 A.2d at 358 n.2.
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his appearance for Hicks, and a trial date was set for April 27 by
agreement of counsel. Unknown to either the prosecutor or the
public defender, Hicks was returned to Delaware on April 26.22
Consequently, trial on the eight-count information was rescheduled
for August 8, 1978,1 a date within the 120-day period then
prescribed by Maryland Rule 746.24 Neither the state nor Hicks
invoked the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to secure his
attendance at trial.1 When the case was called, the prosecutor told
the court that "arrangements" had been made for Hicks' presence,
but that Hicks had "not consented to come. '26 The court ordered the
case continued, remarking: "Obviously we can't do anything with the
man [Hicks] not being here. '"2
On August 25, Hicks filed a motion to dismiss 28 on the ground
that he had not been tried within the 120-day period then prescribed
by Rule 746.1 This motion was heard on October 2, 1978.0 The trial
court determined that the primary issue raised by the motion was
whether Rule 746 was mandatory, without regard to whether the
state or the defendant was responsible for the change of trial date."'
The state contended that the rule was directory only and, alterna-
tively, that the requisite "extraordinary cause" under Rule 7462 was
shown at the August 8 hearing to justify the postponement." Relying
21. Id. at 313, 403 A.2d at 358.
22. Id. The state contended that Hicks had been returned at his own request to the
Delaware prison. Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403
A.2d 356 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The defense
contested the state's assertion and assumed arguendo that Hicks' return was
due to the apparent negligence of the state. Brief for Appellee at 5, State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellee]. The trial court did not consider the point material and no testimony
was taken. Id. at 25-26.
23. 285 Md. 310, 314, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979).
24. See note 4 supra.
25. 285 Md. 310, 314-15, 403 A.2d 356, 358-59 (1979). Delaware authorities
refused to release Hicks for trial on August 8 unless the state invoked the
provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
26. Id. at 314, 403 A.2d at 358; Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 17. The
prosecutor continued:
From my knowledge of Mr. Hicks' whereabouts and his situation, I
think he will finish serving his Delaware sentence this September, and
then he does have a Maryland sentence to serve, and I think there's a
detainer on him in Delaware, he will be sent to the Maryland House of
Correction, so we will have an opportunity to get custody of him some
time beginning in September.
Id. at 18.
27. 285 Md. 310, 314, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979); Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at
18.
28. 285 Md. 310, 314, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979).
29. See note 4 supra.
30. 285 Md. 310, 314, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979).
31. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 26-27.
32. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
33. 285 Md. 310, 315, 403 A.2d 356, 358-59 (1979).
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on the use of the word "shall" within the text of the rule, the trial
court held that Rule 746 was mandatory.-'
Implicitly accepting Hicks' argument that the state bears the
duty of bringing the defendant to trial and that this duty is not
excused merely because the accused is incarcerated in some other
jurisdiction, the trial court found that the state should have either
produced Hicks at trial within the period prescribed by Rule 746 or
filed a motion showing "extraordinary cause" to justify a
postponement. 5 Finding neither, the court granted the motion to
dismiss.
36
The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari prior to consideration of the case by the court of
special appeals.
3 7
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARYLAND RULE 746
Maryland Rule 746 became effective on July 1, 1977, as part of
an extensive revision of the Chapter 700 Rules regulating criminal
cases in the circuit courts of the counties and in the Criminal Court
of Baltimore. 3 The rule, which governs the scheduling of criminal
cases for trial, now provides:
a. General Provision.
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of
counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the
court pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance - Provision for or
Waiver of Counsel),1 391 a trial date shall be set which shall be
not later than 180 days[401 after the appearance or waiver of
counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court
pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance - Provision for or
Waiver of Counsel).
b. Change of Trial Date.
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court
and for extraordinary cause shown, the county administra-
34. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 29.
35. 285 Md. 310, 315, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979).
36. Id.
37. Id. The court of appeals granted certiorari prior to oral argument in the court of
special appeals pursuant to MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-203 (1980).
38. See generally Comment, The New Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure: Time
Table for Lawyers, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 241 (1977).
39. Rule 723(a) provides that either the defendant or his attorney shall appear at
the time and place specified in the summons, unless the attorney enters an
appearance for the defendant in writing on or before that time. Under Rule
723(b), if a defendant appears without counsel, he must be advised of certain
rights, including the right to counsel. Rule 723(c) governs the inquiry into
whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel.
40. See note 4 supra.
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tive judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change
of trial date.41
Prior to the adoption of Rule 746, setting of trial dates in
Maryland was regulated by former Rule 740,42 which incorporated by
reference the provisions of article 27, section 591:
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person
accused of a criminal offense, or within two weeks after the
filing of an appearance of counsel or the appointment of
counsel for an accused in any criminal matter, whichever
shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the
Circuit Court or the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in
which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of
the case, which date shall be not later than six months from
the date of the arraignment of the person accused or the
appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused
whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of
the matter shall not be postponed except for extraordinary
cause shown by the moving party and only with the
permission of the administrative judge of the court where
the matter is pending.
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are
authorized to establish additional rules of practice and
procedure for the implementation of this section in the
Criminal Court of Baltimore City and in the various circuit
courts throughout the State of Maryland.43
The enactment of article 27, section 591 illustrates the Mary-
land General Assembly's awareness of the detrimental effects upon
the criminal justice system caused by excessive delay in scheduling
criminal cases for trial and postponement of scheduled trials for
inadequate reasons." The court of appeals has indicated that the
statute seeks to promote "orderly procedure" by setting an outside
limit on the time allowed the state to prepare for trial.45 To assure
that criminal cases be heard promptly, the court of appeals found
41. Md. Rule 746 (emphasis added).
42. Md. Rule 740 (superseded) was adopted on June 1, 1972. It provided: "The date
of trial and postponements shall be governed by Code, Article 27, section 591."
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1976) was enacted by Act of April 29, 1971, ch.
212, 1971 Md. Laws 500.
44. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979). The court cited
Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573, 318 A.2d 243, 248 (1974), in which
the court of special appeals characterized delay as causative of (1) lost court
time, attorney's time, and witnesses' time due to rescheduling, (2) a de-
trimental image of the judicial system and the attendant lowering of public
confidence in the courts, and (3) a weakening of the deference due to the
General Assembly mandate embodied in § 591. Moreover, delay may cause
prejudice to both sides.
45. See Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 112, 345 A.2d 62, 73 (1975).
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authority in section 591(b) to restrict further the time within which
a case should be brought to trial.46 This led to the court's
promulgation of Maryland Rule 746, which reflected the policy and
emulated the language of section 591.
47
According to Rule 746(a), the criminal assignment commissioner
has thirty days from the earlier of the appearance of the defendant
before the court48 or the appearance of defense counsel pursuant to
Rule 723 to set an initial trial date, 49 an increase from the two-week
period provided in section 591(a). Rule 746(a) further provides a time
period of 180 days5° within which a case must be scheduled for trial.
Section 591(a) similarly allows six months. The 180-day period
begins to run from the earlier of the appearance of the defendant
before the court or the appearance or waiver of defense counsel
pursuant to Rule 723.
By the terms of Rule 746(b), a postponement of the trial date
may be made only upon written motion or motion in open court and
only for "extraordinary cause." The "extraordinary cause" standard
of section 591 is retained in Rule 746(b) as the sole justification for
postponement of criminal trial dates, and, in both, the determination
of whether "extraordinary causes" exists rests exclusively in the
limited discretion of the administrative judge.5' Unlike the statute,
however, the rule permits the administrative judge to authorize
other judges to grant postponements. Neither Rule 746 nor section
591 prescribe any sanction for noncompliance.
The precursors of Rule 746 had consistently been held to be of
only directory force.2 No sanction had ever been imposed for
46. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). See also Wilson v.
State, 44 Md. App. 1, 6, 408 A.2d 102, 106 (1979) (MD. CONST. art. 4, § 18(A)
vests authority in the Court of Appeals of Maryland to make rules having the
force of law governing "practice and procedure in the administration of the...
courts.").
47. Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. 1, 6, 408 A.2d 102, 106 (1979).
48. Md. Rule 746 does not apply until a criminal case reaches the circuit court.
Dates of arrest or preliminary hearings which occur in the district court are
irrelevant. Furthermore, Md. Rule 746 does not pertain to removals from the
district court due to appeals or prayers for jury trial. Time does not begin to run
until a defendant receives a Rule 723 hearing in the circuit court or until
defense counsel enters his appearance with the clerk of the circuit court. Brown
v. State, 27 Md. App. 233, 237, 340 A.2d 409, 412 (1975) (construing Md. Rule
740, the precursor of Md. Rule 746). Where Md. Rule 746 is not applicable, trial
judges retain their traditional discretion over continuances. Id. at 238, 340
A.2d at 413.
49. A trial date is more than a mere docket entry - it is the date on which trial is
to commence. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 114, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (1975).
50. See note 4 supra.
51. Discretionary rulings of judges carry a presumption of validity. Mathias v.
State, 284 Md. 22, 28, 394 A.2d 292, 295 (1978). The aggrieved party bears the
burden of providing the court with a satisfactorily endowed record indicative of
an abuse of the trial court's discretion in granting the motion. Hughes v. State,
43 Md. App. 698, 706, 407 A.2d 330, 336 (1979).
52. See text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
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noncompliance with either section 591 or former Rule 740. Conse-
quently, there had been no need to interpret the meaning of the
"extraordinary cause" necessary to justify the postponement of
criminal trials. Due to the obvious similarities of language between
the rule and the statute and the lack of judicial comment on adoption
of the rule, prosecutors and court administrators throughout Mary-
land apparently assumed that Rule 746 would be identical in effect
to section 591. The result was "almost wholesale violations" of the
rule's requirements." Moreover, it was not clear whether the rule
was intended to implement the accused's sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial or merely to provide a guide to orderly judicial
procedure.
It was almost two years after the adoption of Maryland Rule 746
before the court of appeals had its first opportunity to discuss the
proper application of this rule. Hicks offered an appropriate forum to
address the important issues left unresolved by a plain reading of
the rule.
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
The court of appeals held that Rule 746 was intended to place
mandatory controls on the scheduling and postponement of criminal
cases in Maryland." The Hicks court stated that when the provisions
of the rule regulating trial dates and their postponement are not
observed by the state, the appropriate sanction is dismissal of the
criminal indictment.55 In addition, the court found that the require-
ments of Rule 746 were not intended to implement the accused's
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.5" Thus, the state is not
required to invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers57 in order
to bring a defendant incarcerated in another state to trial within the
period prescribed by the rule." On reconsideration, the court of
appeals gave its holding in Hicks purely prospective effect, applying
it only to criminal prosecutions in which the appearance or waiver of
counsel or appearance of defendant before the court occurs after July
25, 1979:1-
A. Rule 746 is Mandatory
Inasmuch as Hicks was the first case involving the interpreta-
tion of Rule 746 to reach the appellate courts, the state analogized
53. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
54. See text accompanying notes 60-78 infra.
55. See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 104-16 infra.
57. See note 11 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 89-103 infra.
59. See text accompanying notes 126-29 infra.
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that "in the absence of a contrary contextual indication the use of
the word 'shall' is presumed to have a mandatory meaning.""
The court of appeals found that the "admonitions in Guarnera
were largely unheeded, a predictable result so long as under Young
§ 591 was to be accorded directory rather than mandatory force."72
Moreover, the court declared,
By our adoption of Rule 746 in 1977, we intended to
supersede the provisions of § 591(a) and put teeth into a new
regulation governing the assignment of criminal cases for
trial. . . . We deemed it essential, as is evident from the
language of Rule 746, to place mandatory controls over the
scheduling of criminal cases for trial, and over their
postponement, to assure that criminal charges would be
promptly heard and resolved.7
The Hicks court concluded that the language used in adopting
Rule 746, in light of the legislative intention underlying section 591,
must be construed as mandatory. 74 In its reconsideration, the court
noted that the word "shall" is presumed to have a mandatory
meaning under settled principles of statutory construction.7 ' The
court also noted that if the deadline for trial of the case were
directory, not mandatory, and could be ignored whenever conven-
ient, there would be no necessity for the provision in the statute
and rule requiring "extraordinary cause" and permission of an
administrative judge for an extension of the deadline.
The court of appeals observed that "giving § 591 and Rule 746
only 'directory' effect results in almost wholesale violations of the
statute and rule. ' 76 "The provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory
71. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 10-11 (citing Johnson v. State, 282 Md.
314, 321, 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978)). In Johnson, the court of appeals held that
Md. Rule 723(a) was mandatory. That rule formerly provided that an
arraignment hearing "shall" be had within a specified time period after arrest
and provided no sanction for the state's failure to comply. The defense in Hicks
drew an analogy between Md. Rule 723(a) and Md. Rule 746(a) in that both
rules provide for judicial proceedings within a specified time period and both
rules use the word "shall" in their text. Neither rule provides a sanction for
noncompliance. The language and logic of the Johnson decision were persua-
sive, in Hicks' view, that Md. Rule 746 should be accorded mandatory force. See
generally 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 562 (1979).
72. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 317-18, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) (citing Guarnera
v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573-.74, 318 A.2d 243, 249 (1974)).
73. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979).
74. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling on this issue.
75. Id. at 334, 403 A.2d at 369 (per curiam decision on motion for reconsideration)
(citing Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321, 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978); Moss v.
Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-65, 369 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1977)).




the rule's provisions to those of section 591.1 Arguing that the rule
reflected the legislative policy of section 591 and emulated its
language, the state relied on the court's interpretation of the statute
in Young v. State.6 ' There the court of special appeals held that the
provisions of section 591 "'were intended by the Legislature to be
directory and not mandatory because it had not explicitly provided
the extreme sanction of dismissal of an indictment for administra-
tive noncompliance.
6 2
The issue was raised a second time in Guarnera v. State3 when
the court of special appeals again accorded section 591 only directory
force. In the Guarnera opinion, however, the court admonished that
"the message should be loud and clear to the bench, the bar, parties,
witnesses, and to the public, that trials must not and will not be
postponed for ordinary reasons. '"" In Hicks, the state specifically
noted that the rule, like section 591, provided no sanctions for
noncompliance and urged that Rule 746 similarly should be held to
be directory.'
The defendant in Hicks argued that the rule should be
interpreted as mandatory. Recognizing that section 591 had already
been interpreted as directory,' counsel asked the court of appeals to
treat Hicks as a case of first impression7.6 The defendant further
argued that logic dictates that a statute (or rule) be interpreted so as
to remedy the practice it was designed to control. 61 In support of his
position, Hicks argued that, because Rule 746 is expressly more
restrictive than section 591, the court of appeals must have intended
that the rule be binding and that to allow the rule, where it imposes
stricter standards than the statute, to "be ignored at will will lead to
absurd results. 16 9 Hicks also relied on Johnson v. State,70 which held
60. Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 6-8.
61. 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467
(1972).
62. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979) (citing Young v.
State, 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137 (1972)). On appeal, this view was
summarily affirmed by the court of appeals. Young v. State, 266 Md. 438, 294
A.2d 467 (1972).
63. 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 243 (1974).
64. Id. at 573-74, 318 A.2d at 249.
65. The state also claimed that Hicks suffered no prejudice as a result of the
extension of the trial date beyond the then prescribed 120-day limit. State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 313, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979). See note 4 supra.
66. See, e.g., Young v. State, 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, affd per curiam, 266
Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d
243 (1974).
67. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 9.
68. Id. (citing State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975)).
69. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 9.
70. 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
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application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are
not mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient."" The
dissent wholly concurred with the majority's holding that Rule 746
should be construed as mandatory.78
B. Appropriate Sanction for Noncompliance is Dismissal
Rule 746 provides no express sanction for the state's failure to
comply with its terms. In the Hicks court's view, if Rule 746 were to
prove effective, an appropriate sanction would have to be provided to
"compel compliance."79 The sanction of dismissal provides both the
inducement to assure compliance and a remedy for the state's failure
to comply. The court of appeals in Hicks, therefore, affirmed the
lower court's holding that dismissal of the criminal charges is
ordinarily the appropriate sanction for noncompliance with Rule 746
when "extraordinary cause" justifying a trial postponement has not
been established."0 The dissent agreed with the majority on this
issue."1
Neither the majority nor the dissent gave any consideration to
possible alternatives to the sanction of dismissal. 2 On reconsidera-
tion, however, the court of appeals identified two instances in which
it would be inappropriate to dismiss a criminal indictment.83 The
first circumstance would be "where the defendant, either individu-
ally or through his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date
in violation of Rule 746."84 Consent acts as a waiver of the rule, and
it would be improper for the defendant to gain advantage from his
own delay.1 The second circumstance in which dismissal would be
inappropriate is when the act of setting the trial date is not done
within thirty days of the appearance of counsel or the first
77. Id. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.
78. Id. at 321, 403 A.2d at 362 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 336, 403 A.2d at 370 (per curiam decision on motion for reconsideration).
80. Id. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.
81. Id. at 321, 403 A.2d at 362 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
82. For a discussion of the alternatives to dismissal, see Note, The Right To A
Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLuM. L. REV. 846, 859 (1957).
83. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
84. Id.
85. Id. This situation is analogous to a criminal defendant who consents to a
mistrial where the "manifest necessity" standard has not been met. The
defendant cannot take advantage of his own act and prevent a retrial on double
jeopardy grounds. Id. (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976);
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971)). When the state requests a
trial date which violates the rule, either because the trial is scheduled after the
period prescribed by the rule or because the postponement is granted for less
than "extraordinary cause," the accused or his counsel must expressly, on the
record, consent to the delay. Loker, The Effect of State v. Hicks on the
Scheduling and Postponing of Trial, Pursuant to Maryland Rule 746 at 5,
August 1, 1979 (unofficial memorandum).
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appearance of the defendant before the court.8 6 While the court of
appeals found that this provision of Rule 746 is also mandatory, it
reasoned that no prejudice can result to the defendant unless the
trial date is scheduled beyond the maximum period87 within which
trial must be held and, thus, no sanction is necessary.
C. "Extraordinary Cause"
The "extraordinary cause" standard of section 591 was retained
in Rule 746 as the sole justification for postponement of criminal
trial dates.89 Whether "extraordinary cause" has been shown is
"dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 9 For this
reason, the courts have not attempted to compile a comprehensive
list of causes they would view as "extraordinary. "91
In Hicks, the defense argued that the prosecutor made no motion
at the August 8 hearing, either in writing or in open court, to
establish the "extraordinary cause" sufficient to justify a postpone-
ment beyond the period prescribed by Rule 746.9 Alternatively, the
defense maintained that the state was required to invoke the
86. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 337, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979). The court
distinguished between the 180-day requirement and this 30-day requirement:
"[T]he legislative purpose underlying § 591 and Rule 746 will in no way be
advanced by holding that dismissal is the appropriate sanction for violation of
the 30-day requirement." Id. at 335, 403 A.2d at 369.
87. See note 4 supra.
88. 285 Md. 310, 337, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (per curiam decision on motion for
reconsideration).
89. Id. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. A hearing held to determine whether "extraordin-
ary cause" exists may be considered of such importance that the defendant's
presence may be required. Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 708, 407 A.2d
330, 338 (1979). Md. Rule 746(b) states that "extraordinary cause" must be
shown either by written motion or by motion in open court by the moving
party. Md. Rule 746(b) also states that only an administrative judge or his
designee may determine whether "extraordinary cause" exists.
90. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979). Clearly, however, it
is cause beyond what is "ordinary, usual or commonplace." Id. Compare
Copeland v. State, 27 Md. App. 397, 340 A.2d 355 (1975) (defendant's request to
change attorney held to be "extraordinary cause") with Guarnera v. State, 20
Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 243 (1974) (defendant's last minute request to change
attorney held not to be "extraordinary cause").
91. See generally A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft 1968).
92. 285 Md. 310, 314, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979); Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at
6. The transcript of the proceeding on August 8, 1978, records the following
exchange in pertinent part:
MR. HICKSON (Assistant State's Attorney): Mr. Hicks is not present,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have arrangements been made to get him here?
MR. HICKSON: We have, Your Honor, but he has not consented to
come.
. [The prosecutor indicated that Hicks would be returned to
Maryland in September to serve another sentence and the state would
then get custody.]
THE COURT: Well, I don't know what - I don't understand what we're
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Interstate Agreement on Detainers9 3 to bring Hicks to trial and,
thus, the state's failure to invoke the Agreement precluded a finding
of "extraordinary cause. '
The state claimed that a trial date had been set within the
prescribed period of Rule 746 and a postponement had been granted
in open court for the "extraordinary" reason that Hicks, incarcerated
in a Delaware prison, did not appear for trial on the scheduled date.95
According to the state, it had no obligation to invoke the Agreement
to obtain temporary custody of an out-of-state prisoner in order to
comply with Rule 746. 6
The trial court found, however, that the state was required to
invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to obtain Hicks'
presence in court on August 8 or present a motion showing
"extraordinary cause" for a postponement. 97 Finding that the state
had done neither, the trial court dismissed the indictment.9"
The court of appeals held that the lower court had erred,
reasoning that the prosecutor's statement, together with the court's
doing! But obviously we can't do anything with him not being here. I
will have to check into it and see why it is on the list for today.
Obviously we can't do anything with the man not being here.
Id. at 17-18.
93. See note 11 supra.
94. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 8. The defense urged that even if a motion
had been made, no "extraordinary cause" justifying a trial postponement had
been shown. Because Hicks was incarcerated out of state, the state's failure to
invoke the Interstate Agreement to procure his presence at trial made his
absence totally "foreseeable." Id. at 7. Hicks also argued that a defendant has
no duty to bring himself to trial. It is the state's duty to bring the defendant to
trial, a duty which includes invoking the Interstate Agreement when
applicable. By its failure to invoke the Interstate Agreement, the state was
directly responsible for Hicks' absence and ignored its duty to comply with Md.
Rule 746. Hicks reasoned that the state's independent decision not to gain
jurisdiction over an accused cannot be "extraordinary cause." Id. at 7-8. At no
time did Hicks raise the issue of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 22, at 6.
95. 285 Md. 310, 313, 403 A.2d 356, 358 (1979). Delaware authorities refused to
release Hicks for trial on August 8 unless the state invoked the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers. Id. at 314, 403 A.2d at 359.
96. Id. at 314-15, 403 A.2d at 359. The state does have a continuing constitutional
obligation to invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in order to provide
an accused with a speedy trial under the sixth amendment. State v. Wilson, 35
Md. App. 111, 371 A.2d 140 (1977), afld, 281 Md. 640, 655, 382 A.2d 1053,
1064 (1978). The prosecutor explained to the trial court why the Interstate
Agreement was not invoked: "Our normal office procedure is not to do that
unless there are very extraordinary circumstances, because usually there are
costs involved and our budget does not provide for these extraordinary
circumstances." State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 315, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979);
Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 25. The state noted that it had informed
the trial court that Hicks would be available for trial the following month when
he would be released by Delaware authorities to serve an earlier imposed
Maryland sentence. 285 Md. at 314, 403 A.2d at 358.




decision to postpone the case due to Hicks' absence, was equivalent
to the state's having made a timely motion in open court based upon
a showing of "extraordinary cause," thus complying with Rule 746."
The court explained that the state could have invoked the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers in an effort to obtain Hicks' presence in
Maryland on the scheduled trial date, but it was under no obligation
to do so simply to satisfy the requirements of Rule 746.100 When
Hicks did not appear for trial through no fault of his own or of the
state, "extraordinary cause" for a postponement was found to exist.10'
The dissent agreed with the majority that the proceedings on
August 8 implicitly involved a motion for a postponement. 2 The
dissent believed, however, that the state had a duty to invoke the
Interstate Agreement to procure Hicks' presence at trial and that its
failure to do so did not constitute "extraordinary cause" for a
postponement. 13
D. Compliance with Rule 746 Does Not Require Invocation of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers - A Comparison with the
Sixth Amendment
In order to resolve the issue of whether Rule 746 obligated the
state to invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers"° to secure
Hicks' presence, the court first had to consider the pivotal question of
whether Rule 746 was intended to implement the accused's constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial in Maryland. 05
According to the majority, Rule 746 was adopted to set a
standard for orderly procedure, a standard which imposes a shorter
time limit for bringing a case to trial than that mandated by the
sixth amendment. While intending no departure from established
law that a defendant's incarceration in another jurisdiction does not
release the state from its obligation to grant the accused his
99. Id. at 319, 403 A.2d at 361.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 319-20, 403 A.2d at 361. The court stated that when "Hicks did not
invoke the Agreement and was not present in court, but was to be returned by
Delaware authorities to Maryland the month following the scheduled August 8
trial date, extraordinary cause justifying a postponement was plainly shown to
exist." Id.
102. Id. at 321, 403 A.2d at 362 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. See note 11 supra.
105. The right to a speedy trial in Maryland is protected by MD. CoNsT., DECL. OF
RIGHTS art. 21 and U.S. CoNsI. amend. IV. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is
incorporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and is
applicable to the states). See generally Comment, The Right to a Speedy Trial
in Maryland, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 47 (1976).
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constitutional right to a speedy trial,"° the majority stated that "the
time limits prescribed by Rule 746 are not, however, the measure of
the Sixth Amendment right."107 Based upon this conclusion, the court
held that the state was not required to invoke the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers simply to comply with Rule 746.108
The court was unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that
Rule 746 is a statutory prompt trial requirement having a constitu-
tional basis."° The Court of Appeals of Maryland expressed the view
that Rule 746 "stands on a different legal footing than the Sixth
Amendment's constitutional right."'10 Unfortunately, the majority
made no attempt to support this finding or to distinguish the
"prompt disposition of criminal cases" afforded by Rule 746 and the
"speedy trial" guaranteed by the sixth amendment."' The majority's
sole explanation was that Rule 746 "reflects the legislative policy
106. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979). "The right to a
speedy trial is a guarantee afforded to every accused. State v. Hunter, 16
Md. App. 306, 310, 295 A.2d 779, 781 (1972).
107. 285 Md. 310, 320, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979).
108. Id. at 320-21, 403 A.2d at 362.
109. Brief for Appellee, supra note 22, at 12 n.5.
110. 285 Md. 310, 320, 403 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1979).
111. In fact, it appears that the majority carefully refrained from drawing any
comparisons between the sixth amendment and Md. Rule 746. For example, in
its discussion of circumstances in which dismissal would not be appropriate,
such as where a defendant has requested or consented to a delay beyond the
time allotted by Md. Rule 746, the majority cited cases dealing with double
jeopardy for authority, rather than the more strictly analogous sixth amend-
ment cases. Id. at 335, 403 A.2d at 369. Clearly, however, "prompt disposition"
and "speedy trial" are strongly analogous terms. See Wilson v. State, 44 Md.
App. 1, 7, 408 A.2d 102, 106 (1979). Both set outside limits on the time allowed
the state to bring criminal cases to trial. See text accompanying notes 117-21
infra. Both impose the sanction of dismissal of the criminal indictment when
the state fails to provide the accused a trial within the time allowed. See text
accompanying notes 79-80 supra. And both rely on the accused to seek
dismissal of the criminal charges. Md. Rule 736 requires the accused to move
for dismissal. Additionally, the state and the accused have substantial interests
in the prompt resolution of criminal charges which both Md. Rule 746 and the
sixth amendment seem intended to protect.
The accused has an interest in minimizing the anxiety produced by
extended periods of uncertainty, limiting the possibility of loss of witnesses
whose testimony supports his innocence, and preventing the detrimental effects
of prolonged incarceration when he is unable to make bail. Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). Although the majority in Hicks never addressed
the issue, Md. Rule 746 parallels the sixth amendment in shielding a defendant
from these effects.
Societal interests protected by the sixth amendment include the orderly
and efficient use of judicial resources, preservation of testimony favorable to
the prosecution, maintenance of public confidence in the criminal justice
system, deterrence of crime, and minimizing the detrimental effects of delays
on rehabilitation. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 519-20. Although not
specifically stated by the majority in Hicks, Md. Rule 746 again parallels the
sixth amendment in protecting these public interests.
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embodied in . . . § 591, that there should be a prompt trial of
criminal charges.""' 2
It was this conclusion by the majority, that Rule 746 is not of
constitutional dimension, from which Judge Davidson dissented."
3
The dissent noted, "[Sjtatutory prompt trial requirements ...
implement, effectuate, and 'put teeth' into the Sixth Amendment.
Given this interrelationship, it would be . . . incongruous to
interpret a statutory requirement as being narrower in scope and
applicability and, therefore, less effective than the Sixth Amend-
ment requirement. 1 4 Believing that Rule 746 was intended to
implement the sixth amendment, Judge Davidson reasoned that the
state should have been required to take the same actions to comply
with Rule 746 as were necessary to comply with the sixth
amendment." 5 Thus, Judge Davidson would have held that the state
must invoke the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to comply with
Rule 746.116
As a result of Hicks, there are now two criteria to be applied to
the scheduling and postponement of criminal prosecutions in
Maryland, the sixth amendment and Rule 746. Rule 746 provides
that trial must begin within 180 days" 7 plus any additional time
allowed for postponements that are justified by "extraordinary
cause.""" In comparison, the sixth amendment guarantees that a
defendant be tried within a less definite period determined by
applying the four-factor balancing test of Barker v. Wingo."9 Under
Barker, the four factors to be considered are the length of the delay,
the reasons for the delay, the prejudice to the defendant caused by
the delay, and any waiver by the defendant of the sixth amendment
right. This balancing test is not applied until cumulative delays in
bringing a case to trial become presumptively prejudicial to the
112. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
113. Id. at 321, 403 A.2d at 362 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 327, 403 A.2d at 365 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 321-22, 403 A.2d at 362 (Davidson, J., dissenting). Judge Davidson's
dissent draws further support from an earlier court of special appeals' opinion
in Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d 243 (1974). "The legislative
policy of Maryland implementing the constitutional requirement that persons
accused of a criminal offense shall be tried promptly was declared by the
enactment [of § 591]." Id. at 564, 318 A.2d at 244. Thus, by extension, Md. Rule
746 would appear to implement the sixth amendment.
116. 285 Md. 310, 321-22, 403 A.2d 356, 362 (1979) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting).
117. See note 4 supra.
118. Md. Rule 746(b).
119. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The outside time limit allowed by the sixth amendment is
"relative" and is dependent upon a balancing test weighing the four factors. Id.
at 530-33; State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 306, 310, 295 A.2d 779, 781 (1972). See




rights of the accused. 10 Maryland has found such a presumption in a
delay of as little as nine months twenty-three days.'
As the post-Hicks case, State v. Hiken,'22 observed, "[E]ven where
there has been full compliance with Rule 746, the [sixth amendment]
analysis may well result in a finding that the accused's speedy trial
rights were denied.' 1' u But, in practical terms, Rule 746 provides
that most cases must be brought to trial within a time period shorter
than that mandated by the sixth amendment, at least when the
accused is incarcerated within the State of Maryland.
The virtue of Rule 746 is that it provides a definite criterion
which, in the majority of cases, clarifies the outer perimeters of "how
long is too long for the State to bring an accused to trial. 12 4 This
serves to simplify a court's determination of whether an accused's
rights have been abridged and tends to eliminate the subjectivity
inherent in the Barker four-factor balancing test.
Although Rule 746 results in greater protection for the accused
than the sixth amendment standing alone, it must be reiterated that
the rule was adopted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland as a
standard for orderly procedure. Such protection, then, cannot fairly
be said to be more than an incidental benefit to criminal defendants.
Because the rule does not have constitutional underpinnings, the
time period specified by Rule 746 may be changed at the discretion of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Moreover, as in Hicks, "extraor-
dinary cause" to justify a trial postponement under the rule need not
always satisfy constitutional standards.
This "how long is too long" determination can be viewed as
operating along a time continuum. Although it is conceivable that
the sixth amendment could be triggered first, the 180-day time
120. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
121. See State v. Hiken, 43 Md. App. 259, 405 A.2d 284 (1979).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 271 n.18, 405 A.2d at 291 n.18. A fact pattern illustrative of a situation in
which there has been full compliance with Md. Rule 746, but the accused's
speedy trial rights have been denied may be drawn from the facts of Hiken.
Hiken was charged under Maryland law with arson. Trial was scheduled in
accordance with Md. Rule 746, but postponed for the "extraordinary" reason
that the state's evidence was subpoenaed before the trial date by the United
States Attorney's Office in connection with a related grand jury investigation.
The evidence was not returned. Nine months and twenty-three days from the
date of Hiken's arrest, a motion to dismiss was granted for lack of speedy trial.
Although the issue was not addressed by the court of special appeals,
presumably "extraordinary cause" to justify further postponements continued
to exist.
On the other hand, any time that a trial has been postponed for less than"extraordinary cause," where the resultant delay is less than nine months
twenty-three days, presumably the sixth amendment requirement for speedy
trial will have been complied with, but the violation of Md. Rule 746 will cause
dismissal.
124. Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. 1, 5, 408 A.2d 102, 105 (1979).
[Vol. 9
State v. Hicks
period of Rule 746 is inside the nine-month-twenty-three-day
presumptively prejudicial delay period of Hiken, a case construing
the sixth amendment. Thus, criminal defense attorneys, at least
those representing clients incarcerated within Maryland, may
request a dismissal of charges for failure to comply with Rule 746
after 180 days and after each successive delay or postponement,'25
asserting the absence of "extraordinary cause." Once the delay
moves along the time continuum to beyond the point of presumptive-
ly prejudicial delay (nine months twenty-three days), the defendant
may assert his sixth amendment claim independently of any rights
under Rule 746.
E. Holding in Hicks Given Purely Prospective Effect
On reconsideration, the court of appeals gave its holding purely
prospective effect. 1 6 Hicks applies only to those criminal prosecu-
tions in which the appearance or waiver of counsel or appearance of
the defendant before the court occurs after July 25, 1979.17 The
interpretation of the rule in Hicks was a clear break with prior
interpretations of section 591,'1 and the court considered it an
"almost classic example" of a ruling that should be given only
prospective effect."2
V. THE EFFECTS OF HICKS
The Hicks court's interpretation of Rule 746 was viewed by
judges, prosecutors, and court administrators as "chaotic to criminal
125. [It makes not the slightest difference whether a [postponement] requested is
the fifth, the third, or the very first - the reasons for it must satisfy the
administrative judge that they meet the test of extraordinary cause." State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 317, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) (citing Guarnera v. State, 20
Md. App. 562, 574, 318 A.2d 243, 249 (1974)).
126. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 368 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
127. Id. July 25, 1979, was the date on which the mandate was filed. Id. at 334, 403
A.2d at 369.
128. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
129. 285 Md. 310, 338, 403 A.2d 356, 371 (1979) (per curiam decision on motion for
reconsideration). The court applied a three-prong balancing test. Id. at 337, 403
A.2d at 370. See Wiggins v. State, 275 Md. 689, 698-716, 344 A.2d 80, 85-95
(1975). The factors considered were the purpose of the new ruling, the reliance
placed upon the old ruling, and the effect of retrospective application on the
administration of justice. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. at 337-38, 403 A.2d at
370-71. In the court's view, the purpose to be served by the new ruling was to
act as a "protective measure designed to insure compliance with the
requirements" imposed on the state regarding prompt trials. Id. at 337, 403
A.2d at 370. "[T]he critical language of Rule 746, upon which our decision in
this case was based, was essentially unchanged from the language in [§ 591]."
Id. at 336, 403 A.2d at 370. Further, the court found that retroactive
application would increase the burden on the administration of justice by
overturning convictions based on fair reliance upon pre-Hicks decisions and
would not serve to deter future violations. Id. at 337-38, 403 A.2d at 370-71.
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justice."13 Because of crowded court dockets and an insufficient
number of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, court officials
feared that they could not comply with the decision and that many
cases would therefore have to be dismissed. 31 The large number of
criminal prosecutions that faced possible dismissal for lack of timely
trial did little to instill confidence in the judicial system132 and
seemed counterproductive to the Hicks court's stated goal of
promoting an orderly and efficient administration of justice.1
33
As the first post-Hicks 120-day deadline approached, 34 public
pressure intensified to modify the rule in order to preclude dismissal
of the large number of pending cases, many involving serious
charges.'35 In an attempt to comply with the court of appeals'
interpretation of Rule 746, Baltimore City judges resolved as many
cases as possible before trial through pre-trial conferences and plea
bargains. 3 ' The court of appeals recognized the dilemma that the
rule was causing for some jurisdictions 37 and urged the formation of
a task force, consisting of representatives from the state's judicial,
executive, and legislative branches, to recommend solutions.
3
1
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure urged the court to relax the 120-day
130. The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 24, 1979, § A, at 14, col. 1 (morning ed.).
131. The Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 2, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 5, at 6, col. 3.
132. See, e.g., The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 12, 1979, § D, at 16, col. 1 (morning ed.).
133. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (per curiam decision
on motion for reconsideration).
134. November 22, 1979 (120 days from the filing of the mandate on July 25, 1979).
135. Public officials complained they could not comply with the 120-day deadline.
Mary Ann Willin, Deputy City State's Attorney, estimated that 75% or more of
the criminal cases, both misdemeanors and felonies, to be tried in city courts
would have to be forfeited under Hicks. The administrative judge of the
Supreme Bench, the Honorable Robert L. Karwacki, said Ms. Willin's estimate
was too high. Other court officials concurred that the court docket crowding
problems in light of Hicks continued to be serious. The Sun (Baltimore), Oct.
12, 1979, § D, at 16, col. 1 (morning ed.).
"Baltimore prosecutors predicted that 25 to 30 percent of the criminal cases
before the Supreme Bench would not be tried within 120 days and thus would
be dismissed." The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1 (morning
ed.) (emphasis added).
The state public defenders, who represent most criminal defendants, were
particularly hard-pressed to handle the cases with such dispatch, due to an ever
increasing caseload and a lack of manpower resources. The Sun (Baltimore),
Nov. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1, at 15, col. 4 (morning ed.).
136. The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 12, 1979, § D, at 16, col. 1 (morning ed.). "'We've
been knocking out 40% of the defendants brought over from the jail on this
crash program in plea bargains,' Judge Karwacki said." Id.
137. The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 24, 1979, § A, at 14, col. 2 (morning ed.).
138. Id. The court sought suggestions from the state's circuit court judges on how to
reduce the crisis caused by Hicks. For example, Judge Karwacki urged that
"the time limit be increased to 180 days." The Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 12, 1979,
§ D, at 16, col. 1 (morning ed.).
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limit of Rule 746.139 The court of appeals relented and unanimously
accepted the Committee's recommendations that Rule 746(a)
be amended on an emergency basis to change the time limit
specified in the Rule from "120" days to "180" days, and...
that this Rules Change shall take effect November 16, 1979,
and shall apply to all proceedings thereafter commenced
and, so far as practicable, to all proceedings then pending
140
The change came as welcome relief to harried court officials
who had been straining to comply with the 120-day time deadline.141
The court's emergency rule change, however, has not completely
stilled the public clamor over Hicks. Rule 746 is, for the time being,
very much in limbo. Eight bills aimed at amending section 591 to
direct the court of appeals to modify the rule's present formulation
were introduced in the most recent session of the legislature. 4 2
VI. CONCLUSION
By holding that Maryland Rule 746 is mandatory and that the
appropriate sanction for noncompliance is dismissal of the criminal
139. The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 17, 1979, § A, at 15, col. 4 (morning ed.). "The
committee [composed of judges, lawyers and legislators] is not really comfort-
able with its recommendation ... [to the court of appeals]. 'We [the
committee] are not sure this is going to resolve all the problems. But 120 days
is unrealistic at this time.'" Id. The court of appeals had authority to alter the
120-day rule pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(b) (1976).
140. 6 Md. Reg. 1915 (1979). "There are weaknesses in the system that will cause
[some of the courts] not to be able to meet the 120-day rule, Robert C. Murphy,
the chief judge, said before the court voted unanimously to make the change."
The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1 (morning ed.). In a
discussion before the vote, however, Chief Judge Murphy indicated that he still
prefers the shorter time limit: "There's a very strong feeling on the part of
everyone in the system that we'd like to keep the 120 days to form strict
guidelines we can target on for the benefit of the public." Id. at 15, col. 4.
141. The Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 17, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1 (morning ed.). "'rhis is the
relief we were looking for,' said Judge Robert L. Karwacki, administrative
judge of the Supreme Bench. 'We feel we can fully comply with a 180-day
rule.'" Id.
"Stephen H. Sachs, the state attorney general, said, 'the change by the
court ... will obviously relieve some pressure. This will be helpful to
prosecutors.'" Id. at 15, col. 4.
142. The eight bills introduced in the 1980 session of the General Assembly were
S.B. 42, H.B. 205, H.B. 219, H.B. 324, H.B. 351, H.B. 614, H.B. 615, and H.B.
636. Senate Bill 42 and House Bill 324 sought to limit the application of Md.
Rule 746(a) to non-felony cases. Two bills attempted to lessen the "extraordin-
ary cause" standard of Md. Rule 746(b): H.B. 205 to "cause" and H.B. 615 to
"good cause." House Bill 219 was introduced to change the effect of Md. Rule
746 from mandatory to directory by substituting "may" for "shall." House Bill
614 went further by adding that postponement was but one factor to be
considered in determining whether the accused had been denied a speedy trial.
House Bill 351 went even further, incorporating the Barker four-factor
balancing test. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
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indictment, the court has "put teeth" into the legislative policy
embodied in section 591 that there be a "prompt disposition of
criminal charges." Hicks is fair warning to all who are responsible
for the administration of the criminal justice system in Maryland
that rules established by the legislature and the judiciary for the




Since the initial printing of this article, section 591(a) has been
amended.14 The section now provides that a trial may be postponed
for "good cause" shown by the moving party, a retreat from the
standard of "extraordinary cause." Although it remains to be seen
whether the court of appeals will incorporate this change into its
own rules, the General Assembly has clearly indicated its desire to
"pull the teeth" of Rule 746. Even if the court of appeals chooses to
amend Rule 746 to allow postponements for "good cause," it may
have little practical impact because "good cause," like "extraordi-
nary cause," must be applied on a case-by-case basis and means no
more or no less than what the court says it means.
143. See Act of May 6, 1980, ch. 378, 1980 Md. Laws 1283.
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